I was about to write a comment until I saw footnote 1: yes, that is pretty much what I was going to say.
Lewis thoughts the properties fundamental physics was trying to discover were the maximally natural properties. He also thought properties constructed out of maximally natural properties via simpler chains of definition were *more* natural than properties constructed out of maximally natural properties via complex chains of definition. You reject that latter claim.
But it seems to me there's a big difference, and you'll want really different arguments, if you're accepting that there's some deep distinction between the fundamental properties (mass, charge, spin, maybe consciousness if you want to go that way) and everything else, versus a view on which there are no fundamental properties, and the various categories that can be used in modeling bits of the world, whether from particle physics or economics, are all metaphysically on a par (I think Nancy Cartwright has this view).
Thank you for the comment, and I basically think that's right. To be clear, I don't want to commit myself to being these basic kinds. If we can make a theory that can be preserve the functions of things in the world without any type of privileged kinds of things whatsoever, then I would certainly prefer that (or well, I probably shouldn't commit myself before actually looking at a concrete theory, but I very much expect it would be preferable).
Yet another great post I find myself disagreeing with! I'm scared for the day you post something I'm forced to praise uncritically.
I take it that the sort of ostensive definition that is supposed to get the idea of natural kinds in our heads, is pointing at the sorts of categories used in scientific practices, noting their projectability, and conferring a special status on those 'sorts' of categories called 'natural kind-hood'. Consequently, the most important feature of natural kinds is their projectability. Now, you ask us to imagine a scenario where "Sold and gilver" are natural kinds, but presumably the natural kind realist is going to reject that such a scenario is possible. Ex hypothesi, the sorts of projections we are able to make about gold and silver don't work on sold and gilver, because sold and gilver are gerrymandered around temperature. So the success of projections like "X is gilver, and so X is pale in coloration" will be far less successful than "X is silver, and so X is pale in coloration." As a consequence, it doesn't seem like sold and gilver will meet the projectability bar the realist wants for their kinds. I also think this reply helps answer your question of how natural kinds matter. It seems to me like the idea behind natural kinds is that they are the most projectable categorizations, that is the sense in which they 'matter', they are deeply intertwined with our best scientific practices.
Now, some of what you say probably counts against natural kind views that require some sort of metaphysical goop that is supposed to be what the natural kind is (aristotelian essences, platonic forms, whatever) but as far as I can tell, in the literature there are realist views about natural kinds which deny those sorts of things (namely promiscuous realism, but also various microstructural views). I agree with you that, getting rid of that goop or reassigning it to another category (par impossible) doesn't seem like it would matter, but that criticism doesn't seem like it would carry over to microstructuralists who are focused on particular sorts of underlying physical mechanisms.
Haha, I wonder whether such a day will ever come...
A few things to this: If the theory doesn't actually add more to the description of one's worldview, then I don't really think it matters, and I'm happy to allow that way of speaking. But I don't think realists would be comfortable with this, even if they're essentialists. That means, I think, that they believe that their position *does* add something to the description of their worldview--that is, there is a real sense that our worldview is complicated by natural kinds, even if it's not by positing essences. And what do we get from this complication? As far as I can tell, nothing (for the reasons I explain in the post.
Now, maybe it's just by definition that natural kinds are projectible kinds or something, but at that point, I just think it falls into the former category of being simply a way of speaking, not a genuine disagreement. Perhaps we want to say that projectability makes the kinds more real for some reason. But I just don't see what justifies making the inference from "X kind is projectible" to "X kind is more real than gerrymandered kinds."
So, I think the realist view does add more to the description of the world view, it just need not postulate extra entities of the metaphysically gooey sort. I think, for instance, microstructuralists who take natural kinds to be categories that cohere with things that have a particularly projectable microstructure are basically like moral naturalists in that, the worldview description is different even though they needn’t posit any additional entities.
I do think natural kinds are project able by definition. Or actually, maybe putting it more carefully, a desideratum for any good list of necessary and sufficient conditions for natural kinds is that it must include projectability as a necessary condition. The sense in which projectability is supposed to be a guide to realism is that it’s supposed to show where the joints are at. If a category is natural and real it’s going to be projectable because that’s partly *why* a category being natural and real matters in the first place.
What do you think of qualia? Some of these arguments against higher-level phenomena seem to me like they would cut down qualia before they hurt my poor innocent natural kinds
Here is some evidence for no natural kinds:
Are Emotions Natural Kinds? https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/j.1745-6916.2006.00003.x
Species problem in biology: https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/agricultural-and-biological-sciences/species-problem
Are Chemical Kinds Natural Kinds? https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-23015-3_19
Water is Not H2O https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/1-4020-3261-7_18
I was about to write a comment until I saw footnote 1: yes, that is pretty much what I was going to say.
Lewis thoughts the properties fundamental physics was trying to discover were the maximally natural properties. He also thought properties constructed out of maximally natural properties via simpler chains of definition were *more* natural than properties constructed out of maximally natural properties via complex chains of definition. You reject that latter claim.
But it seems to me there's a big difference, and you'll want really different arguments, if you're accepting that there's some deep distinction between the fundamental properties (mass, charge, spin, maybe consciousness if you want to go that way) and everything else, versus a view on which there are no fundamental properties, and the various categories that can be used in modeling bits of the world, whether from particle physics or economics, are all metaphysically on a par (I think Nancy Cartwright has this view).
Thank you for the comment, and I basically think that's right. To be clear, I don't want to commit myself to being these basic kinds. If we can make a theory that can be preserve the functions of things in the world without any type of privileged kinds of things whatsoever, then I would certainly prefer that (or well, I probably shouldn't commit myself before actually looking at a concrete theory, but I very much expect it would be preferable).
Yet another great post I find myself disagreeing with! I'm scared for the day you post something I'm forced to praise uncritically.
I take it that the sort of ostensive definition that is supposed to get the idea of natural kinds in our heads, is pointing at the sorts of categories used in scientific practices, noting their projectability, and conferring a special status on those 'sorts' of categories called 'natural kind-hood'. Consequently, the most important feature of natural kinds is their projectability. Now, you ask us to imagine a scenario where "Sold and gilver" are natural kinds, but presumably the natural kind realist is going to reject that such a scenario is possible. Ex hypothesi, the sorts of projections we are able to make about gold and silver don't work on sold and gilver, because sold and gilver are gerrymandered around temperature. So the success of projections like "X is gilver, and so X is pale in coloration" will be far less successful than "X is silver, and so X is pale in coloration." As a consequence, it doesn't seem like sold and gilver will meet the projectability bar the realist wants for their kinds. I also think this reply helps answer your question of how natural kinds matter. It seems to me like the idea behind natural kinds is that they are the most projectable categorizations, that is the sense in which they 'matter', they are deeply intertwined with our best scientific practices.
Now, some of what you say probably counts against natural kind views that require some sort of metaphysical goop that is supposed to be what the natural kind is (aristotelian essences, platonic forms, whatever) but as far as I can tell, in the literature there are realist views about natural kinds which deny those sorts of things (namely promiscuous realism, but also various microstructural views). I agree with you that, getting rid of that goop or reassigning it to another category (par impossible) doesn't seem like it would matter, but that criticism doesn't seem like it would carry over to microstructuralists who are focused on particular sorts of underlying physical mechanisms.
Haha, I wonder whether such a day will ever come...
A few things to this: If the theory doesn't actually add more to the description of one's worldview, then I don't really think it matters, and I'm happy to allow that way of speaking. But I don't think realists would be comfortable with this, even if they're essentialists. That means, I think, that they believe that their position *does* add something to the description of their worldview--that is, there is a real sense that our worldview is complicated by natural kinds, even if it's not by positing essences. And what do we get from this complication? As far as I can tell, nothing (for the reasons I explain in the post.
Now, maybe it's just by definition that natural kinds are projectible kinds or something, but at that point, I just think it falls into the former category of being simply a way of speaking, not a genuine disagreement. Perhaps we want to say that projectability makes the kinds more real for some reason. But I just don't see what justifies making the inference from "X kind is projectible" to "X kind is more real than gerrymandered kinds."
So, I think the realist view does add more to the description of the world view, it just need not postulate extra entities of the metaphysically gooey sort. I think, for instance, microstructuralists who take natural kinds to be categories that cohere with things that have a particularly projectable microstructure are basically like moral naturalists in that, the worldview description is different even though they needn’t posit any additional entities.
I do think natural kinds are project able by definition. Or actually, maybe putting it more carefully, a desideratum for any good list of necessary and sufficient conditions for natural kinds is that it must include projectability as a necessary condition. The sense in which projectability is supposed to be a guide to realism is that it’s supposed to show where the joints are at. If a category is natural and real it’s going to be projectable because that’s partly *why* a category being natural and real matters in the first place.
Shoot, I was writing a post on this. Welp, good job either way.
Haha, sorry for scooping you!
No prob, it happens
What do you think of qualia? Some of these arguments against higher-level phenomena seem to me like they would cut down qualia before they hurt my poor innocent natural kinds