First off, great writing, great content. You've made it so schmationally clear that I needed to subscribe.
I find it not ironic though that your example seeming is actually an illusion. This highlights the fact that seemings are not necessarily coherent with our beliefs or even "reality".
1. Any person can have false seemings.
2. If a person can have false seemings they should be skeptical of their seemings.
3. We should be skeptical of our seemings.
Intuitions certainly play an important role in how we understand the world but I believe they should be considered more like Bayesian prior probabilities, giving us a starting point from which to then construct our instantaneous theory of the moment. A theory which we can test against reality (measuring the lines) and then integrate into our web of beliefs.
There is some irony in that this post did convince me of something. I feel my perspective on certain foundational concepts in philosophy has changed. It feels like an aspect I've never even reflected on is suddenly different, though I couldn't tell you what it was I believed before.
Thank you for sharing. I loved your reduction of inductive arguments to probabilistic deductive arguments, going to borrow that someday.
Thank you very much, and I'm glad you've been schematically convinced to subscribe! :)
I don't think I buy your argument though. I wouldn't deny that we often have false seemings--in fact many of our seemings (or at least mine) are contradictory. But I don't think that undermines the judtificatory value of seemings when we don't have reason to doubt them.
<insert religious demonym here> don't have any reason to doubt <insert religion here>'s mythology, whether or not they are faced with evidence to the contrary. Our seemings stem from what amounts to an inference derived from the structure of our web of beliefs composed with the current context. Our web of beliefs can be structured such that it prevents us from extending or modifying it to any significant degree. This black hole like nature of seemings leads me to hold a huge amount of skepticism towards them (when they can't be obviously confirmed by evidence). That said they are the only guide we have towards new ideas and insight about reality. When we encounter new evidence it's our seemings that tell us where to integrate it into our web.
But what do I know haha. I'm still just starting down this philosophy road, this is how it _seems_ to me. Thanks for engaging in a humble and respectful manner.
First, I appreciate how you extended Oppy’s point to apply to all arguments, not just deductive ones. Perhaps Oppy focused on derivations specifically due to the sociological dynamics within the philosophy of religion. That focus makes sense in context, but the broader applicability of the idea is worth emphasizing.
Second, I think the critique might benefit from an additional extension. As it stands, we seem to be presupposing logic and probabilistic coherence as a shared foundation. However, there’s clearly conceptual space for those who reject this. For instance, a contextualist might hold different credences depending on the context, and this divergence often comes down to values. Here, the importance of normative disagreement becomes apparent.
Some of us share epistemic norms because we share the same goals. This is particularly evident when comparing EA/rationalist circles to philosophers who deeply value something like virtue epistemology or see deliberative democracy as central to social epistemology, even as a way of validating epistemic procedures. Think of figures like Lakatos or Habermas in this regard.
First off, great writing, great content. You've made it so schmationally clear that I needed to subscribe.
I find it not ironic though that your example seeming is actually an illusion. This highlights the fact that seemings are not necessarily coherent with our beliefs or even "reality".
1. Any person can have false seemings.
2. If a person can have false seemings they should be skeptical of their seemings.
3. We should be skeptical of our seemings.
Intuitions certainly play an important role in how we understand the world but I believe they should be considered more like Bayesian prior probabilities, giving us a starting point from which to then construct our instantaneous theory of the moment. A theory which we can test against reality (measuring the lines) and then integrate into our web of beliefs.
There is some irony in that this post did convince me of something. I feel my perspective on certain foundational concepts in philosophy has changed. It feels like an aspect I've never even reflected on is suddenly different, though I couldn't tell you what it was I believed before.
Thank you for sharing. I loved your reduction of inductive arguments to probabilistic deductive arguments, going to borrow that someday.
Thank you very much, and I'm glad you've been schematically convinced to subscribe! :)
I don't think I buy your argument though. I wouldn't deny that we often have false seemings--in fact many of our seemings (or at least mine) are contradictory. But I don't think that undermines the judtificatory value of seemings when we don't have reason to doubt them.
<insert religious demonym here> don't have any reason to doubt <insert religion here>'s mythology, whether or not they are faced with evidence to the contrary. Our seemings stem from what amounts to an inference derived from the structure of our web of beliefs composed with the current context. Our web of beliefs can be structured such that it prevents us from extending or modifying it to any significant degree. This black hole like nature of seemings leads me to hold a huge amount of skepticism towards them (when they can't be obviously confirmed by evidence). That said they are the only guide we have towards new ideas and insight about reality. When we encounter new evidence it's our seemings that tell us where to integrate it into our web.
But what do I know haha. I'm still just starting down this philosophy road, this is how it _seems_ to me. Thanks for engaging in a humble and respectful manner.
Enjoyed this!
Great article! I have two main comments.
First, I appreciate how you extended Oppy’s point to apply to all arguments, not just deductive ones. Perhaps Oppy focused on derivations specifically due to the sociological dynamics within the philosophy of religion. That focus makes sense in context, but the broader applicability of the idea is worth emphasizing.
Second, I think the critique might benefit from an additional extension. As it stands, we seem to be presupposing logic and probabilistic coherence as a shared foundation. However, there’s clearly conceptual space for those who reject this. For instance, a contextualist might hold different credences depending on the context, and this divergence often comes down to values. Here, the importance of normative disagreement becomes apparent.
Some of us share epistemic norms because we share the same goals. This is particularly evident when comparing EA/rationalist circles to philosophers who deeply value something like virtue epistemology or see deliberative democracy as central to social epistemology, even as a way of validating epistemic procedures. Think of figures like Lakatos or Habermas in this regard.
Thank you for the comments!
I definitely agree that what I've said here is limited in scope, in that it presupposes a certain view of what makes a successful argument.