“However, the direct realist who admits the possibility of hallucinations will be in exactly the same position. Sure, if your perceptions are of external objects, then they will be of external objects (obviously). But there is no way of telling whether what you are having are perceptions of external objects, or hallucinations, since the two are subjectively indistinguishable.”
This is equating visual data with experience when the two aren’t necessarily the same. For example, I could be looking at a stick in water that looks bent, but which I know isn’t bent and only appears that way because it’s in water. Someone else could look at that same stick and believe they are looking at a bent stick (wrongly) and the direct realist could just say we are both looking at a straight stick that only appears bent, whereas the indirect realist couldn’t make that same claim.
Well, the sense in which you're looking at a straight stick is the sense in which an indirect realist would deny that you're looking at anything, since the object of perception isn't the stick on indirect realism. But the indirect realist will still be able to say that both your perceptions are caused by a straight stick (in the relevant way), and so in this sense you are both looking at a straight stick, and the one who thinks it's bent is wrong. I'm not sure I'm seeing what the indirect realist is supposed to be missing here?
The indirect realist would deny we are seeing a straight stick however, as our perception of that stick can only be mediated by the appearance of it being bent. We can’t see the straight stick according to the indirect realist. The direct realist meanwhile, would say we are looking at a straight stick (the cause of our experience) that just looks bent. And just because it looks bent doesn’t mean we aren’t directly perceiving the stick. I’m not sure why you would think the indirect realist would think we are seeing a straight stick, since this is the classic case where they would say we *aren’t* looking at a straight stick (we can only see the “bent” stick). But as I noted, I think you are making too much out of raw visual perception and are ignoring the causal relationship between the world and our experience (which gives us direct perception).
I agree that we don't see a straight stick on direct realism, if you take seeing a straight stick as having a straight stick be the object of perception. But that is simply because we never see any stick or anything.
But I am just not sure what your point is with this. While I don't have a straight stick as the object of my perception under veridical perception, my visual experience is still caused in the relevant way by a straight stick, and so my knowledge of it seems just as secure. I guess I'm just asking you to explain exactly what your worry is for indirect realism. (Assuming I am correct in thinking that you're raising a worry)
We DO see a straight stick under direct realism, it’s just a straight stick that appears bent. You’re assuming the “phenomenal principle” where appearance is a property of what’s being seen, and presenting it as a problem for the direct realist. But you are ignoring the adverbial’s response where perception isn’t an object but a verb, and we can reject the phenomenal principle by applying the property (being bent) to the seeing itself rather than the object.
Sorry, I made a typo, I didn't mean to say that we don't see a straight stick under *direct* realism, I meant to type *indirect* realism. I agree that a direct realist will say that we see a straight stick that appears bent, rather than a bent stick.
But still, I don't see what the problem for indirect realism is supposed to be here. Nothing I said in the post is supposed to be an argument against direct realism, it's simply supposed to be a reply to an argument against indirect realism.
No worries. I am just pointing out that the direct realist won't accept the hallucination response to their critique, as they wouldn't recognize the hallucination as being the same perception as a vertical one. One's internal subjective experience causes the former whereas the latter is caused by the external objective world (whether or not someone could actually tell).
I very much appreciate your article, however, and am glad to see some writing on epistemology rather than the easy stuff.
“However, the direct realist who admits the possibility of hallucinations will be in exactly the same position. Sure, if your perceptions are of external objects, then they will be of external objects (obviously). But there is no way of telling whether what you are having are perceptions of external objects, or hallucinations, since the two are subjectively indistinguishable.”
This is equating visual data with experience when the two aren’t necessarily the same. For example, I could be looking at a stick in water that looks bent, but which I know isn’t bent and only appears that way because it’s in water. Someone else could look at that same stick and believe they are looking at a bent stick (wrongly) and the direct realist could just say we are both looking at a straight stick that only appears bent, whereas the indirect realist couldn’t make that same claim.
Well, the sense in which you're looking at a straight stick is the sense in which an indirect realist would deny that you're looking at anything, since the object of perception isn't the stick on indirect realism. But the indirect realist will still be able to say that both your perceptions are caused by a straight stick (in the relevant way), and so in this sense you are both looking at a straight stick, and the one who thinks it's bent is wrong. I'm not sure I'm seeing what the indirect realist is supposed to be missing here?
The indirect realist would deny we are seeing a straight stick however, as our perception of that stick can only be mediated by the appearance of it being bent. We can’t see the straight stick according to the indirect realist. The direct realist meanwhile, would say we are looking at a straight stick (the cause of our experience) that just looks bent. And just because it looks bent doesn’t mean we aren’t directly perceiving the stick. I’m not sure why you would think the indirect realist would think we are seeing a straight stick, since this is the classic case where they would say we *aren’t* looking at a straight stick (we can only see the “bent” stick). But as I noted, I think you are making too much out of raw visual perception and are ignoring the causal relationship between the world and our experience (which gives us direct perception).
I agree that we don't see a straight stick on direct realism, if you take seeing a straight stick as having a straight stick be the object of perception. But that is simply because we never see any stick or anything.
But I am just not sure what your point is with this. While I don't have a straight stick as the object of my perception under veridical perception, my visual experience is still caused in the relevant way by a straight stick, and so my knowledge of it seems just as secure. I guess I'm just asking you to explain exactly what your worry is for indirect realism. (Assuming I am correct in thinking that you're raising a worry)
We DO see a straight stick under direct realism, it’s just a straight stick that appears bent. You’re assuming the “phenomenal principle” where appearance is a property of what’s being seen, and presenting it as a problem for the direct realist. But you are ignoring the adverbial’s response where perception isn’t an object but a verb, and we can reject the phenomenal principle by applying the property (being bent) to the seeing itself rather than the object.
Sorry, I made a typo, I didn't mean to say that we don't see a straight stick under *direct* realism, I meant to type *indirect* realism. I agree that a direct realist will say that we see a straight stick that appears bent, rather than a bent stick.
But still, I don't see what the problem for indirect realism is supposed to be here. Nothing I said in the post is supposed to be an argument against direct realism, it's simply supposed to be a reply to an argument against indirect realism.
No worries. I am just pointing out that the direct realist won't accept the hallucination response to their critique, as they wouldn't recognize the hallucination as being the same perception as a vertical one. One's internal subjective experience causes the former whereas the latter is caused by the external objective world (whether or not someone could actually tell).
I very much appreciate your article, however, and am glad to see some writing on epistemology rather than the easy stuff.