I think this account of omnipotence - x is omnipotent IFF x can bring about any possible state of affairs (fully explicated) - fails.
Plantinga asks us to imagine a being known as McEar, part of whose essence it is that his only ability is to scratch his ear - “McEar can only scratch his ear” is a necessary truth. Under this definition of omnipotence, McEar is omnipotent. Why? Because “McEar creates a rock” is not a metaphysically possible state of affairs. McEar can bring about any fully explicated possible state of affairs because there is no possible state of affairs in which McEar does anything but scratch his ear.
The McEar example gets into some controversial issues, such as whether a being like McEar is even metaphysically or epistemically possible, and if counter-possibles are coherent or useful, so here’s a different example:
Suppose there is an abstract object, like a number or a proposition,
which is essentially unable to bring about any state of affairs because it is causally impotent (by the definition of an abstract object). There is no possible state of affairs “an abstract object does x”, so there is no possible state of affairs that an abstract object cannot bring about.
But that’s because abstract objects literally can’t do ANYTHING - if a definition of omnipotence classifies something that can’t do a single thing as omnipotent, it’s wrong.
Thank you, that is a very good critique. I actually think it is even worse for me than you say - my account implies that literally EVERYTHING is omnipotent. For example, if I am only powerful enough to bench press 50 kg, then it is obviously impossible for me to bench press 51 kg. And so the state of affairs "A being which cannot lift 51 kg lifts 51 kg" is contradictory. So everything is omnipotent.
So I think I will have to rework my account, I will probably make a new post on that!
Yeah I think that’s a very serious problem if your definition is essentially “x is omnipotent IFF x can bring about any possible state of affairs that it’s possible for x to bring about”.
I think there are a few things you can do to avoid this problem.
First, you can change it to “x is omnipotent IFF x can bring about any possible state of affairs consistent with its essence”. This has the advantage of explaining why I’m not omnipotent if I can’t lift 51kg - it is merely an accidental fact about me that I can’t lift 51kg, so my inability to lift 51kg is a limitation. On the other hand, it is often said to be an essential fact about God that he can’t do an evil act (unless you’re Richard Swinburne, who thinks that many of God’s attributes are accidental), so he is not limited by not being able to be do it.
However, as I said earlier this runs us into the McEar and abstract objects problems because they are limited only by their essential properties.
Alternatively, you could just keep the definition and deny that God is essentially omnibenevolent or essentially omnipotent (maybe he can create a stone then limit his own power so he can’t lift it). Therefore, God could be both omnipotent and omnibenevolent at the moment, but it would be possible for him to limit his own power or goodness. This isn’t attractive to many people except Swinburne, whose views are quite idiosyncratic.
A final option, given by Erik Wielenberg, is to define omnipotence as follows: “x is omnipotent IFF x there is no state of affairs that x cannot actualise because of a lack of power” - i.e. x is never limited by its power. This allows for God not being able to do immoral actions because the reason God cannot do something immoral is not a lack of power, but some other thing (his goodness). Wielenberg gives a story about Hercules, who is meant to be maximally strong, but he can’t lift a slippery rock. Plausibly, this is not a limit to his strength because his strength is not the thing that means he is unable to lift the rock.
So for McEar, on this account, we must ask: is the reason that McEar can’t create a planet because of a limitation in his power, or because of some other fact?
Well, since McEar is a made up guy, we can answer this however we want. Either:
1. McEar is just a normal kind of being, so he is limited by his strange disability AND his human body, so he is not omnipotent.
2. McEar is God, and God has the essential property of only being able to scratch his ear because, as it turns out, every single other act would be enormously immoral. In this case (though still a bit counterintuitive), McEar may be omnipotent because the reason that McEar cannot actualise any other state of affairs is something other than his power.
As far as I can tell, this is the most promising account of omnipotence.
I think the version referring to essence is perhaps a good idea, although I am unsure how much merit there is to talk of essences generally, and so I am a bit skeptical of it.
I think the last definition you give also has quite a lot of appeal, although I am again sort of skeptical of the concepts in play. I think power is a sort of vague concept which is hard to pin down. So do I have the power to lift a 1 tonne rock? No, but I have the power to use a machine to do it, and in that sense I have the power to do so. You might say that doesn't count, since I am using a tool or something. But when I lift a rock normally, it is also not really me, it is just my arm - and I am distinct from my arm. This can go on. I especially think it is problematic to boil the concept down to a quantitative magnitude which comes in degrees. This is sort of what I was trying to avoid with my account - by reducing a being's power to the set of the states of affairs that it can bring about, it becomes a very airtight concept what powers a certain being has, I think.
Also, if your account involves having infinite power (which I am not sure the one you outlined actually does), then it seems to involve an infinite intensive magnitude, which I think might be impossible. This is also something I am trying to avoid.
One definition I am toying around with is:
"X is omnipotent IFF x can bring about any possible state of affairs, fully explicated without reference to what brings the state of affairs about"
So I might not be able to lift a certain rock, but it is logically possible for it to be lifted, and so I am not omnipotent. But an omnipotent being can lift it, if it is possible for it to be lifted.
Perhaps you think that free will is a counterexample to this. It is possible for me (perhaps) to freely choose an action, but God cannot make me freely choose an action.
But if it is possible for me to freely choose an action, then the state of affairs of me freely choosing it involves describing who brought it about (namely me), and so it is not a counterexample.
The biggest problem with this is that it might mean that omnipotence and onibenevolence are incompatible, since it is possible to do an immoral act generally, but not for god.
This might be denied by biting a pretty big bullet and saying that no one ever does an immoral act (or perhaps a bad act, since it being immoral might have to do with who does it (for example on deontology)).
This is because God, if he exists, is necessary - meaning he exists in every possible world. Him being omnibenevolent means that he cannot create a bad world, or do a bad thing. But perhaps creating someone who does an actually bad thing is itself a bad thing, and thus there is no possible world where anyone does a bad thing (on the whole). And so it is impossible to do a bad thing. Although this has some strange consequences.
I think this account of omnipotence - x is omnipotent IFF x can bring about any possible state of affairs (fully explicated) - fails.
Plantinga asks us to imagine a being known as McEar, part of whose essence it is that his only ability is to scratch his ear - “McEar can only scratch his ear” is a necessary truth. Under this definition of omnipotence, McEar is omnipotent. Why? Because “McEar creates a rock” is not a metaphysically possible state of affairs. McEar can bring about any fully explicated possible state of affairs because there is no possible state of affairs in which McEar does anything but scratch his ear.
The McEar example gets into some controversial issues, such as whether a being like McEar is even metaphysically or epistemically possible, and if counter-possibles are coherent or useful, so here’s a different example:
Suppose there is an abstract object, like a number or a proposition,
which is essentially unable to bring about any state of affairs because it is causally impotent (by the definition of an abstract object). There is no possible state of affairs “an abstract object does x”, so there is no possible state of affairs that an abstract object cannot bring about.
But that’s because abstract objects literally can’t do ANYTHING - if a definition of omnipotence classifies something that can’t do a single thing as omnipotent, it’s wrong.
Thank you, that is a very good critique. I actually think it is even worse for me than you say - my account implies that literally EVERYTHING is omnipotent. For example, if I am only powerful enough to bench press 50 kg, then it is obviously impossible for me to bench press 51 kg. And so the state of affairs "A being which cannot lift 51 kg lifts 51 kg" is contradictory. So everything is omnipotent.
So I think I will have to rework my account, I will probably make a new post on that!
Yeah I think that’s a very serious problem if your definition is essentially “x is omnipotent IFF x can bring about any possible state of affairs that it’s possible for x to bring about”.
I think there are a few things you can do to avoid this problem.
First, you can change it to “x is omnipotent IFF x can bring about any possible state of affairs consistent with its essence”. This has the advantage of explaining why I’m not omnipotent if I can’t lift 51kg - it is merely an accidental fact about me that I can’t lift 51kg, so my inability to lift 51kg is a limitation. On the other hand, it is often said to be an essential fact about God that he can’t do an evil act (unless you’re Richard Swinburne, who thinks that many of God’s attributes are accidental), so he is not limited by not being able to be do it.
However, as I said earlier this runs us into the McEar and abstract objects problems because they are limited only by their essential properties.
Alternatively, you could just keep the definition and deny that God is essentially omnibenevolent or essentially omnipotent (maybe he can create a stone then limit his own power so he can’t lift it). Therefore, God could be both omnipotent and omnibenevolent at the moment, but it would be possible for him to limit his own power or goodness. This isn’t attractive to many people except Swinburne, whose views are quite idiosyncratic.
A final option, given by Erik Wielenberg, is to define omnipotence as follows: “x is omnipotent IFF x there is no state of affairs that x cannot actualise because of a lack of power” - i.e. x is never limited by its power. This allows for God not being able to do immoral actions because the reason God cannot do something immoral is not a lack of power, but some other thing (his goodness). Wielenberg gives a story about Hercules, who is meant to be maximally strong, but he can’t lift a slippery rock. Plausibly, this is not a limit to his strength because his strength is not the thing that means he is unable to lift the rock.
So for McEar, on this account, we must ask: is the reason that McEar can’t create a planet because of a limitation in his power, or because of some other fact?
Well, since McEar is a made up guy, we can answer this however we want. Either:
1. McEar is just a normal kind of being, so he is limited by his strange disability AND his human body, so he is not omnipotent.
2. McEar is God, and God has the essential property of only being able to scratch his ear because, as it turns out, every single other act would be enormously immoral. In this case (though still a bit counterintuitive), McEar may be omnipotent because the reason that McEar cannot actualise any other state of affairs is something other than his power.
As far as I can tell, this is the most promising account of omnipotence.
Those are some good ideas!
I think the version referring to essence is perhaps a good idea, although I am unsure how much merit there is to talk of essences generally, and so I am a bit skeptical of it.
I think the last definition you give also has quite a lot of appeal, although I am again sort of skeptical of the concepts in play. I think power is a sort of vague concept which is hard to pin down. So do I have the power to lift a 1 tonne rock? No, but I have the power to use a machine to do it, and in that sense I have the power to do so. You might say that doesn't count, since I am using a tool or something. But when I lift a rock normally, it is also not really me, it is just my arm - and I am distinct from my arm. This can go on. I especially think it is problematic to boil the concept down to a quantitative magnitude which comes in degrees. This is sort of what I was trying to avoid with my account - by reducing a being's power to the set of the states of affairs that it can bring about, it becomes a very airtight concept what powers a certain being has, I think.
Also, if your account involves having infinite power (which I am not sure the one you outlined actually does), then it seems to involve an infinite intensive magnitude, which I think might be impossible. This is also something I am trying to avoid.
One definition I am toying around with is:
"X is omnipotent IFF x can bring about any possible state of affairs, fully explicated without reference to what brings the state of affairs about"
So I might not be able to lift a certain rock, but it is logically possible for it to be lifted, and so I am not omnipotent. But an omnipotent being can lift it, if it is possible for it to be lifted.
Perhaps you think that free will is a counterexample to this. It is possible for me (perhaps) to freely choose an action, but God cannot make me freely choose an action.
But if it is possible for me to freely choose an action, then the state of affairs of me freely choosing it involves describing who brought it about (namely me), and so it is not a counterexample.
The biggest problem with this is that it might mean that omnipotence and onibenevolence are incompatible, since it is possible to do an immoral act generally, but not for god.
This might be denied by biting a pretty big bullet and saying that no one ever does an immoral act (or perhaps a bad act, since it being immoral might have to do with who does it (for example on deontology)).
This is because God, if he exists, is necessary - meaning he exists in every possible world. Him being omnibenevolent means that he cannot create a bad world, or do a bad thing. But perhaps creating someone who does an actually bad thing is itself a bad thing, and thus there is no possible world where anyone does a bad thing (on the whole). And so it is impossible to do a bad thing. Although this has some strange consequences.
But I am still thinking it over.
I might not have formulated that too well, but my phone is running out of power, lol
Why do we care if some myths and fables from some desert tribes a long time ago are logically consistent? 😉