I like (2), and in particular a fourth option is some sort of multiverse/maximizing-the-good theodicy. We can give Pareto arguments for why the best (or one of the best) worlds will consist in lots of universes that are at least on-balance good. But lots of on-balance good states of affairs will still have *gratuitous* evils. As long as God *also* actualizes better states of affairs, I don’t see the problem with (and think God might be obligated to!) also actualizing ok states of affairs.
MV theodicies have issues too, and I don’t think they’re perfect, but something like a maximization approach is right.
I like (2), and in particular a fourth option is some sort of multiverse/maximizing-the-good theodicy. We can give Pareto arguments for why the best (or one of the best) worlds will consist in lots of universes that are at least on-balance good. But lots of on-balance good states of affairs will still have *gratuitous* evils. As long as God *also* actualizes better states of affairs, I don’t see the problem with (and think God might be obligated to!) also actualizing ok states of affairs.
MV theodicies have issues too, and I don’t think they’re perfect, but something like a maximization approach is right.